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Irresponsibility Breeds Contempt
Suzanna Sherry

·E VERYONE

IS

PICKING

on the Supreme

and that is where they make their mistake.

Court these days. To be sure, some of the

Congress

criticism is warranted: the Court has

responsibility to ensure that the legislation it

has

completely

abdicated

its

butchered history - to say nothing of constitu

enacts is constitutional, reasonable, and in

tional text - in its attempt to interpret the

the public interest. Many of the recently

Eleventh Amendment, and betrayed its own

invalidated federal statutes were the product

federalism principles by second-guessing a

of popular or political pressure, not reasoned

state court's interpretation of state law (and

deliberation. The statutes were unnecessary,

applying a constitutional test explicitly limited

badly drafted, and often patently unconstitu

to the case before it). But the current attacks on

tional - but they were popular, which is what·

the Court go well beyond individual cases or

mattered to the enacting Congress. And the

doctrines, and are reminiscent of Jeffersonian

statutes the Court has thus far invalidated

jabs at John Marshall or the John Birch Soci

are only the tip of the iceberg when it comes

ety's

to congressional carelessness.

"Impeach

Ead

Warren"

campaign.

Pointing to the Court's invalidation of parts of

In this essay, I do not try to explain why

more than 30 federal statutes over the past

Congress has become so irresponsible; I leave

decade, critics blame the Justices. The Court is

that to public choice theorists and others.

portrayed as arrogant, self-aggrandizing, and

Nor do I mean to signal agreement with the

unduly

giving

Supreme Court's recent controversial cases. I

insufficient deference - or even a modicum of

do not claim that the Court is always - or

activist,

and

accused

of

even often - correct in its reasoning or its

respect - to Congress.
Of

course,

Congress is

these

critics presume that

worthy of deference

and respect -

results, but merely offer a (limited) defense
of extreme provocation: when Congress acts

Suzanna Sherry is the Cal Turner Professor of Law and Leadership at the Vanderbilt University Law School.
She wishes to thank Lisa Bressman, Paul Edelman, and Daniel Farber for their comments, and Misty Fairbanks
(Vanderbilt class of .zoo3) for outstanding research assistance.
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irresponsibly, we can hardly blame the
Court for responding with contempt.
so

The Constitution gives Congress extremely
broad but not unlimited power. In enacting
some recent statutes, however, Congress has
ostentatiously thumbed its nose at those limits
in order to satisfy popular demand or interest
group clamoring. These statutes exceed even
an expansive view of Congress's constitutional
power.
The Court invalidated both the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) and the Gun
Free School Zones Act as beyond Congresss
power under the Commerce Clause.1 These are
the only statutes that have been struck down
for exceeding the Commerce Clause power
since 1937. Some critics conclude that these
invalidations portend a modem return to the
pre-1937 Court's miserly view of congressional
power. I would suggest instead that the long
hiatus - extending into the period of domi
nance by the current conservative majority and the Court's rejection of Commerce Clause
challenges to other statutes, are evidence that
Congress, not the Court, is ignoring precedent.
The essential problem with VAWA and the
Gun-Free School Zones Act is that Congress
tried to regulate intrastate crime, not interstate
commerce. Congress justified its authority by
arguing that both violence against women and
the threat of gun violence near schoolyards
have an ultimate effect on interstate commerce:
battered women spend less money and travel
less because of their battering; children whose
education has been disrupted by gun violence
tum into less productive adults. Congresss

argument cannot be a plausible interpretation
of the Commerce Clause, because it gives
Congress unlimited power. Had VAWA and
the Gun-Free School Zones Act been upheld
as valid, Congress could have used the same
reasoning to regulate every criminal and
tortious act, as well as all aspects of education
and family law.2 Taken in combination, virtu
ally every action by every individual has some
effect on interstate commerce, and thus could
be regulated.
To see how these two statutes expand
. congressional power beyond all limits,
compare VAWA and the Gun-Free School
Zones Act to other federal statutes, all
upheld by the Court. In the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, Congress prohibited discrimination by
commercial enterprises, and did so in circum
stances that suggested that the states were
unable or unwilling to protect the victims of
discrimination. In a series of environmental
statutes, Congress acted to safeguard the
national interest in clean air and water,
recognizing that individual state legislation
would be both ineffective (because states
cannot stop incoming dirty air and water the
way they can bar illegal alcohol or diseased
cattle) and unlikely (because the first state to
act would be put at a commercial disadvan
tage). Many federal criminal statutes require
as a predicate for prosecution that the person,
object, or criminal activity cross state lines indeed, Congress's response to Lopez was to
re-enact the federal Gun-Free School Zones
Act but with an additional provision requir
ing that the offending gun have moved in
interstate commerce. More recently, Congress
enacted the Drivers' Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA), upheld by the Court subsequent to

l See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S . 598 (2000) and United Stat�s v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2 Marriage and divorce cause various economic effects, not the least of which is the fluctuation in
children's well-being, which eventually might affect their adult productivity. In addition, marriage
and divorce also often result in the parties moving from one state to another, in expansion or
contraction of spending, and in the interstate movement of money as non-custodial parents send
child-support checks across state lines.
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The DPPA regulated information,

which can and does move across state lines

their invalidation by the Court, that trans
gresses previously established norms.
But both statutes were exceedingly popular, .

and which states cannot control as effectively

and in election years

as Congress can.

-

1990 and 1994 - gave

All these other statutes reflect, at a mini

members of Congress the ability to point to

mum, one of three basic principles underlying

their handiwork on the campaign trail. After

Congress's Commerce Clause authority. First,

all, who could befor violence against women or

is

guns in schoolyards? The damage to the

indivisibly national, the Commerce Clause

constitutional allocation of power - and, as I

gives Congress the power to regulate virtually

note later, the unnecessary duplication of

every economic activity, however tenuous its

already-existing state statutes - could not

connection to interstate commerce. Second,

possibly outweigh the political benefits that

because

the

United

States

economy

anything that actually crosses state lines is fair

accrued to Congress in enacting the legislation.

game. Finally, if federalism is not to be reduced

The Gun-Free School Zones Act, for example,

to John Calhoun's vision of states' rights, Con

passed the House by a vote of 313 to

gress must be permitted to act in circumstances

Senate by a voice vote, only days before election

that peculiarly affect the national interest or are

day.

l,

and the

beyond the competence of states to regulate,

The Court has also recently invalidated two

whether or not they directly involve commer

statutes for exceeding the power granted to

cial activity. These three principles, taken

Congress by section 5 of the Fourteenth

together,

Amendment. One is VAWA, which Congress

give

Congress

extremely

broad

authority - perhaps broader than some readers

sought to justify as an exercise of its section 5

(or some Justices) might like. But even these

power even if it could not be enacted under

three principles are not enough to authorize

the Commerce Clause. The Court also struck

the regulation of intrastate crime merely

down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

because it has spill-over effects on interstate

(RFRA), which Congress purported to enact
4
under section 5. Again, however, even if we

commerce.
Thus, if we recognize any limits at all on
Congress's authority under the Commerce

statutes cannot fit within it.

and

Section 5 gives Congress the power to enforce

exceeded those limits. It would be

the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth

Clause, the statutes invalidated in

Morrison

take an expansive view of section 5, these two

Lopez

possible to argue, of course, that the Commerce

Amendment. It does not give Congress any

Clause power ought to be unlimited. But doing

additional power to

so would necessarily abandon two principles

provisions. Thus, it leaves Congress and the

enlarge

or

interpret

those

that have been recognized, to a greater or lesser

Supreme Court with the same relative author

degree, by every branch of the federal govern

ity to declare the meaning of the Constitution

ment since the founding: that the federal

as under any other constitutional provision,

government is a government of enumerated

merely adding another source of power for

powers, and, relatedly, that the authority of the

congressional enactments. If the Supreme

federal government does not completely over

Court declares that a particular states behavior

lap that of the state governments. It is thus the

does or does not violate the Equal P rotection

enactment of the statutes by Congress, and not

Clause, for example, Congress may no more

3 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (zooo) .
4 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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override that determination than it may over

any limits at all on Congr�ional power under

ride a judicial decision that a state's behavior

section 5, Congress cannot "enforce" the

does or does not violate the Ex Post Facto

Fourteenth Amendment by adopting an inter

Clause. Should the Court decide that a

pretation of it directly contrary to the Supreme

particular state activity does not violate the

Court's interpretation.

Constitution, Congress cannot rule that the

It is but a small step from that recognition to

states activity is nevertheless linconstitutional.

the

What Congress may do instead is to make the

Employment Division v. Smith,

states behavior

illegal; but to do so it musf find

Court held that neutral, generally-applicable

an independent constitutional source. of power

state laws.with an incidental effect on religious

to enact a statute prohibiting the behavior.

unconstitutionality

of

RFRA.

In

the Supreme

practices do not violate the Constitution.

This much of the argument, while certainly

Congress disagreed, and enacted RFRA to

contingent and sometimes contested, follows

require states to ,exempt religious objectors

from two centuries of the practice of judicial

from such neutral laws. Congress needed a

review, in which the Court is the final -

source of power for the statute. Because

although not the only - interpreter of the

RFRAS

Constitution. We might envision a regime· in

prohibitions far outstripped any effect on

which the federal legislature and judiciary had

commerce,· the Commerce Clause could not

·

broad •coverage

and

categorical

equal authority to declare a state's activity

provide that source of power.5 But neither can

unconstitutional, but such a system would

it be a valid exercise of Congress's section 5

allow Congress to be the final arbiter of its own

powers, .because RFRA makes illegal a state

constitutional

action that the Supreme Court has specifically

·

authority,

draining •judicial

review of all effect. Moreover, if Congress had

held constitutional. RFRA does not 'enforce"

the

action

the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth

unconstitution�l despite a Supreme Court ruling

Amendment unless Congress has the power to

to the contrary, why couldn't it·similarly declare

overrule th� Supreme Courts interpretation of

authority

constitutional

to. hold

a

state's

what the Supreme Court has

those provisions.

already declared. unconstitutional? Note that

Note that this is still a narrow limit on an

this is different from Congresss judgments

expansive power. Congress can still enact

about its own statutes: if the Supreme Court

prophylactic or remedial legislation that goes

declares . a· federal

constitutional,

beyond the constitutional prohibitions. If, for

Congress may nevertheless decline to re�enact

example, Congress had gathered evidence that

it (or the president may veto it), believing it

sutes were enacting neutral laws as a pretext

unconstitutional.

statute

But where

Congress is

for discrimination against certain religions -

attempting to govern state conduct, it must

which, under the Supreme Courts inter

have a constitutional source of power beyond

pretation,

·

would

violate the Constitution -

its mere belief that the state has violated the

Congress might have. decided that requiring

Constitution. As with the Commerce Clause,

accommodation of religious objectors

then, I

necessary to prevent s_tates from undermining

am

essentially arguing that if·there are

s It is illuminating to note that, after the Court invalidated RFRA, Congress passed the. Religious

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, which essentially re-enacted RFRA's requirements but
only in circumstances that implicate federal funding, interstate commerce, or substantive violations
of the religion clauses as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Two federal courts have already upheld
the new statute. Freedom Baptist Church of Delaware County v. Middletown Township, 204
F.Supp.2d 857 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Mayweathers v. Terhune, 2001 WL 804140 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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the constitutional prohibitions. But Congress

Congress's power under section 5, VAWA

had no such evidence, and probably could not

exceeded them.

have found any: RFRAS supporters testified

Two other recent · federal statutes also

that the problem the bill sought to remedy was

exceeded Congress's powers. The Court has

that

already

states

were

insensitive

rather

than

invalidated

the

Communications

deliberately discriminatory toward religious
6
practices.

Decency Act (CDA). As Justice Stevenss

The combination of an expansive (but not

out, the statute flagrantly ignored all of the

majority opinion in

Reno

v.

ACLu8

pointed

unlimited) reading of the Commerce Clause

careful First Amendment limits that the Court

and an expansive (but not unlimited) reading

had

of section 5 will invalidate very few statutes.

regulations designed to· protect children. The

But if the limits are to mean anything at all,

CDA was content-based, prohibited indecent

they must mean that Congress cannot interfere

and offensive speech rather than just obscene

previously

placed

on

pornography

with purely intrastate activities that do not

speech, provided insufficient definitions of

otherwise violate the Constitution. RFRA was

what speech was prohibited, imposed criminal

just such an interference. The enactment of

rather than civil penalties, and had the

RFRA, however...was driven by forces powerful

inevitable effect of broadly restricting pro

enough to drown any concern for its constitu

tected speech even among adults. But it

tionality. Liberals and conservatives came

great

together to support RFRA, because liberals

clamoring to restrict childrens access to on-line

viewed it as rights-protective and conservatives

pornography, Congress did itself a favor even

viewed it as religion-protective. Between that

while it ignored the First Amendment. Not

public

relations:

fact and the enormous lobbying power of the

surprisingly, the. CDA

Catholic

tion year

Church,

among

other

religious

organizations, the few opponents of RFRA

170

co-sponsors -

and by a 97 to 3 vote in the Senate.

the

was

public

enacted in an elec

(1996), by a vote of 414 to 16 in the
House and 91 to 5 in the Senate.

didn't stand a chance. It passed unanimously in
the House - where it had

was

with

As with RFRA and the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, Congress's response to the invalida
tion of the CDA

was

to enact narrower and

VAWA failed for a much simpler reason.

more thoughtful legislation. The Child Online

Again, we begin by noting that under section 5,
Congress can only "enforce" the substantive

Protection Act (COPA), recently upheld by
the Supreme Court,9 remedies the most

provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.

glaring errors in the CDA. It prohibits a

Those substantive provisions regulate only

narrower and more precisely defined category

state action. Because the part of VAWA that

of speech, and applies to a more limited set of

struck down tried to regulate private actors

communications. Moreover, unlike the CDA,

rather than government officials, it was not an

it exempts speech with serious literary artistic,

was

appropriate enforcement of the substantive

political, or scientific value, and allows speakers

provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.7

to raise the affirmative defense of a good faith

Once again, if there are any limits at all on

attempt to shield minors from the material. All

6 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
7 In the Court's view, there was insufficient evidence to support the legislation on the alternative
ground that state officials had abdicated their responsibility to protect women from domestic
violence; this distinguishes VAWA from earlier civil rights statutes protecting J,\frican-Americans.
8 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
9 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S.Ct. 1700 (2002).
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of these aspects of COPA serve to reduce its
impact on protected speech among adults and
to lessen its chilling effect on speech in general.
COPA thus shows more congressional atten
tion to constitutional considerations than the
CDA did. Again, however, it took a Supreme
Court brickbat to get Congress's attention.

staff that such a change would violate the
Constitution. I invite .all of you to work with
me to strengthen our copyright laws in all of
the ways available to us. As you know, there is
also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee
may look at that next Congress.13

T he Court is considering another federal

By and large, Congress seems to view the Court

statute, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term

and the Constitution as minor impediments to
4
be ignored whenever possible.I

Extension Act (CTEA), as this essay goes to
press.Io The primary problem with the CTEA
is that by extending the term of

existing

Congress's abdication of its responsibilities
is also reflected in some recent statutes that are

copyrights, Congress is not "promot[ing] the

completely unnecessary. VAWA, for example,

progress of science and useful arts:'n Rather

simply duplicates remedies available under

than purchasing for the public an increase in

state law. All states have both criminal and civil

creative exertions - the purpose of the power

laws prohibiting rape and other violence

under the Intellectual Property Clause - Con

against women. To the extent that these laws

gress is simply givi�g a windfall to copyright
owners whose copyrights are about to expire.12

are inadequate to the task, it is because of the

And Congress provided this windfall at the

almost always takes place away from wimesses,

explicit behest of powerful copyright owners

victim reluctance, and the obduracy - or even

difficulties of proof inherent in an act that

first

gender bias - of juries. None of those

copyrighted in 1928, was about to fall into the

difficulties is remedied by moving the lawsuit

public

down the street from the state to the federal

like

Disney,

whose

domain.

famed

Passed

by

mouse,

overwhelming

majorities in the House and Senate a month

courthouse, and thus VAWA cannot be

before election .day 1998, the CTEA

w�

justified as necessary to remedy state underen

by Congressman Sonny Bono's

forcement of laws prohibiting violence against

defended

women. The Gun-Free School Zones Act

widow and successor in office:

Sonny wanted the term of copyright
protection to last forever. I am informed by

similarly criminalizes behavior that is already

illegal in most states;I5 again, it results only in a

IO See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 200I), cert. granted sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. OI6I8, I22 S.Ct. Io62 (Feb. I9, 2002).
n U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
I2 For a more extended discussion of the history and meaning of the Intellectual Property Clause, and
of why the CTEA is unconstitutional, see Paul J. Heald .OJ Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the
Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev.
m9.
I3 44 Cong. Rec. H995I-52 (daily ed. Oct. 7, I998) (statement ofHon. Mary Bono).
I
14 For another argument about Congress's failure to consider the constitutionality of its enactments,
see Neal Devins, Congress As Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 5I
Duke L.J. 435 (2ooI).
I5 Justice Kennedy,' concurring in Lopez, stated that over 40 states had such statutes, at least by the
time Lopez was decided in I995· Excellent historical research by Misry Fairbanks has uncovered 29
such state statutes pre-dating the I990 federal act, and eight other states in which judicial
interpretation did or could have applied more general statutes to schoolyards. A list of those statutes
is available from the author.
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change of venue. The Electronic Signatures in

Appeals was considering the case, Congress

Global and National Commerce Act (E

enacted the ACPA. The Second Circuit

SIGN) duplicated legislation in almost half

ultimately affirmed the district court's ruling in

the states; at the time of its passage, numerous
other states were considering such legislation.16

than the FTDA. Thus, in that case, everything

But E-SIGN, like the other statutes I discuss,

the ACPA accomplished could be done -

extremely popular: enacted in another

was

its entirety - but did so under the ACPA rather

indeed,

had

been done - under the FTDA.

election year

(2000), it passed the House by a
vote of 426 to 4 and the Senate by a vote of 87

Many other subsequent cases confirm that the

to o.

broader remedies to trademark owners. A

Another recent federal statute duplicates
pre-existing federal remedies. The Anticyber
squatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)

ACPA offers neither greater protection nor
congressional

committee

considering

the

ACPA had testimony before it from law
professors,

who canvassed the cases and
·

ena�ed in 1999 to combat the practice of

explained the adequacy of the FTDA in

"cybersquatting": individuals registering oth

combatting cybersquatters. But trademark

was

ers' trademarks as internet domain names. The

owners and their representatives clamored for a

cyber-pirate sometimes tries to sell the domain

new statute, and cybersquatters themselves are

name back to the trademark owner, sometimes

disreputable, so the ACPA was appended to a

tries to divert customers to his own products,

massive appropriation

and sometimes traps the user's browser so that

discussion in either chamber.

she

must

click

through

hundreds

bill with no floor

of

The Age Discrimination in Employment

advertisements before exiting the site (with the
17
cyber-pirate making money on each click).

unnecessary statute, in this case because its

Whatever the merits of banning cyber

beneficiaries simply did not need congressional

Act (ADEA) is another example of an

unnecessary.

solicitude. The AD EA, first passed in 1967 and

Only a few years earlier, Congress had enacted

broadened through subsequent amendments,

the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA).

prohibits

That statute could be - and frequently

-

against anyone over the age of 40. It was meant

used to force cybersquatters to turn over

to serve the laudatory purpose of preventing

trademarked domain names to their rightful

employers from maintaining "No Elders Need

squatting, the ACPA itself

owners.

Sporty's Farm

v.

was

was

Sportsman's Market18

employers

from

discriminating

Apply" policies. But because Congress - with

offers the most telling evidence of the ACPl\s

out sufficient thought - wrote it broadly, the

duplication of the FTDA. In that case, a federal

ADEA has become instead a powerful protec

district court had used the FTDA to order the

tion for incumbent workers at the expense of a

domain name registrant to turn over the name

younger workforce. It has, in fact, resulted in a

to the trademark owner, but refused to award

tremendous transfer of wealth to the current
19
generation of older workers.

damages

because

the

sufficiently "willful:'

violation

was

not

While the Court of

Through

careless

drafting,

Congress

16 See Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 Vand. L. Rev.
309, 361 (2002).
17 For a more extended discussion both of cybersquatting and of why the ACPA was unnecessary (and
harmful), see id. at 317-58.
18 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000).
19 See Samuel Issacharoff � Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination? The
ADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 7 80 (1997). This article also contains a more extensive
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invited the ADEA's ex.tension and over·
zealous application to disgruntled - but not
disadvantaged - workers. The problem is
that in patterning the ADEA after statutes
prohibiting discrimination against such
groups as women and racial minorities,
Congress treated individuals over 40 as if
they were members of a similarly disadvan
taged and defenseless class. While it is
possible that at some age - 70? So.? 90? people tend to become peculiarly vulnerable,
it i� absurd to maintain that one is over the
hill at 40.
Perhaps my approach of the half-century
mark colors my judgment, but it does not
seem that those over 40 have any of the
indicia of discrete and insular minorities.
They are, if anything, disproportionately
represented in the halls of both corporate
and political power, disproportionately
wealthy, and more likely to discriminate than
to be discriminated against. There is no
history of generalized discrimination or
exclusion from positions of power. Unlike
discrimination based on race or gender,
'ruscrimination" on the basis of age is usually
the result of economic considerations rather
than of demeaning stereotypes. Moreover,
whatever limitations are placed on employ
ees over 40 are usually imposed by employ·
ers who are themselves In the same age
group: except perhaps in the late and
unlamented Silicon Valley culture, 30-year
olds don't generally have power to hire, fire,
or set salaries for those 40 and up.
This necessarily brief examination of the

20
21
22
23

54

characteristics of the over-40 crowd suggests
that the ADEA protects a segment of the
American population least in need of
protection. Thus, while the Supreme Court
may have been wrong to invalidate part of
the statute as unconstitutional,20 the ADEA
was certainly an unwise exercise of Con
gress's authority. The amendments expand
ing the age range of covered individuals were
particularly flawed, but also easily explain
able: by the early- 1980s - before the most
significant amendments - the American
Association of Retired Persons had become
the largest private, non-profit, non-partisan
organization in the world, and was labeled
"the nation's most powerful special interest
lobby:'21 Moreover, the AARP's members vote
- and the 1986 amendments, eliminating
mandatory retirement entirely, were passed
by both chambers a month before election
day.
Even some statutes that might be useful
are compromised by Congress's neglect of its
responsibilities. The Supplemental Jurisdic
tion Act (§ 1367) is one example. After the
Supreme Court limited the reach of pendent
and ancillary federal jurisdiction in Finley v.
United States,22 Congress quickly attempted to
return the law to its pre- Finley state. Unfortu·
na:tely, Congress - abetted by law professors
- was careless in its drafting. As a result,
lower courts have been struggling with new
confusion created by the statute. Some courts
have held that the statute expands the reach
of supplemental jurisdiction;23 others have
concluded that § 1367 contracts pre-Finley

discussion of why the ADEA was not necessary.
See Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, ;28 U.S. 62 (2000).
See lssacharoff.el Harris, supra note 19, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 811-12 .el n.1;7.
490 U.S. S4S (1989).
See Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927 (9th
Cir. 2001); Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 73 F.3d 928 (1th Cir. 1996); In re
Abbott Laboratories, ;1 F.3d ;24 (;th Cir. 199;); but see Trimble v. Asarco, Inc. 232 F.3d 946 (8th
Cir. 2000); Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3rd Cir. 1999); Leonhardt v.
Western Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631 (10th Cir. 1998).
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jurisdictional c;loctrines. 24

courts have granted) illustrate the conse

The ACPA (as already noted, duplicative of

quences of congressional irresponsibility. "It is

the FTDA) is also an example of a hasty and

inconceivable that Congress meant to autho

poorly drafted statute causing interpretive

rize such inanities when it attempted to

difficulties for courts. Although the ACPA

remedy discrimination against the disabled.

overlaps in coverage with the FTDA, the stat·

But its inattention to language and detail, and

utes use different language, and courts are thus

its haste to enact a popular statute, have led to

struggling to define the new phrases. Moreover,

an explosion of ADA litigation.

the ACPA allows in rem suits against offending

The most notorious - although not the

domain names themselves, but the statutory

most egregious - is the Supreme Court's

provision creates many ambiguities that courts

holding that golfer Casey Martin must be

are currently resolving in different ways. 25

allowed to use a cart in competition, although
27
his competitors are required to walk. The

Finally,

there

is the Americans With

Disabilities Act (ADA), recently invalidated in
26
part by the Supreme Court.
Once again,

.Court's justification

lobbying pressures and sloppy drafting resulted

walking. As commentators pointed out, that

was

that golf is essentially

about putting a ball in a hole, not about

in a statute that is as flawed as the others I have

reasoning could have ripple effects throughout

canvassed. Like the other statutes, the ADA

professional sports: older baseball players who

(1990) by over

can no longer run the bases might demand

whelming majorities: 377 to 28 in the House

extension of the dciignated hitter rule (the

was

passed in an election year

91 to 6 in the Senate.

Part of the ADA is

existence of the DH rule in the American

devoted to prohibiting intentional discrimina

League proves that baseball is not about

and

tion against the disabled, and that section,

running the bases);28 shorter basketball players

while causing some interpretive difficulties as

could demand stepladders, since " basketball,

to what constitutes a disability, is otherwise

like golf, is fundamentally a sport about

largely unproblematic; unlike those over 40,

putting a ball in a hole, which is a lot easier to
29
do with the aid of a stepladder."

disabled Americans were often the victims of

If those hypotheticals seem farfetched, a

the kind of irrational and demeaning discrimi

quick perusal o( the lower court cases yields

nation that warrants a legal remedy.
But the ADA also requires employers,

equally bizarre reslllts. At 5 feet 2 inches, I'm

public entities, and private providers of public

at a disadvantage in movie theaters, sports

accommodations to make "reasonable accom·

arenas, and the like. If, at a particularly excit·

modations" for individuals with disabilities.

ing play, the people seated in front of me stand

The outrageous demands that plaintiffs have

up, I have no hope of seeing the action. But

made under this provision (some of which

disabled individuals have successfully sued to

24 See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Aldridge, 906 F.Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Guaranteed Systems, Inc.
v. American National Can Co., 842 F.Supp. 8SS (M.D.N.C. 1994); see also Richard D. Freer,
Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction
Statute, 40 Emory L.J. 44S (1991).
2s For �discussion of these interpretive difficulties, see Sherry, supra note 16, SS Vand. L. Rev. at 342-4s.
26 See Board of Trustees of the.Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, s31 U.S. 3s6 (2001).
27 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, s32 U.S. 661 (2001).
28 See David Broder, Golf, Baseball, and ... , Washington Post, June 3, 2001 at B7.
29 Joe Queenan, D!fferently-Abled Athletes, Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1998 at Al8 (commenting on
lower court decision).
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Suzanna Sherry
require stadiums to provide wheelchair seating

Another litigant claimed that his sleep apnea

that allows them to see over the heads of stand
ing patrons.30 Other plaintiffs have forced

and narcolepsy entitled him to two naps a day
4
on the job.3 Football lovers with hearing

ABC to trial by claiming that the telephone

problems challenged the NFLS blackout rule,

screening process by which contestants are

arguing that the games had to be televised

selected for the show "W ho Wants to Be a

because they could not hear them on the
5
radio.3 Several college athletes with poor

Millionaire" fails to accommodate individuals
with hearing problems or reduced mobility in
1
their not-so-fast fingers.3 One lucky litigant

academic records have challenged the NCAAS

who claimed a· learning disability - partly on

eligibility requirements as discrimination
against students with learning disabilities.36

the basis of SAT scores in the 3oos and 4oos

Poor

was

-

awarded twice the normal time to take the

bar exam (spread out over four days) plus the
use

of a computer on the essay portions.

drafting

and

an

overbroad

statute

designed primarily to pacify interest groups
combine to make the ADA a potent source of
these types of lawsuits.

Although she failed despite these accommo
dations, the court ordered the bar examiners
to allow her to repeat the exam with the same
accommodations, in addition to

$7500

in

compensation for earlier failures to offer

accommodations.32

Not all of these statutes - or the others invali
dated by the Supreme Court - were unconsti
tutional. But all of them were the product of

And even sillier ADA suits, although

congressional irresponsibility. It is no wonder

ultimately resolved in favor of defendants, are

that the Court does not give much deference to

clogging the federal courts. One employee,

an institution that seems to care so little about

fired after threatening a supervisor, argued

its own deliberative role in our constitutional

that the firing violated the ADA because she

regime. Perhaps if Congress started taking its

should have been allowed to walk away from

own responsibilities seriously, the Court might

her supervisors if they caused her stress.33

start taking Congress more seriously.

fjB

30 See Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Lara v.
Cinemark, 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000) (requiring comparable sight-lines in movie theaters).
1 See Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (nth Cir. 2002) (reversing district court grant
3
of summary judgment to defendants).
32 Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 2001 W L 930792 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2001).
33 See Reed v. LePage Bakeries, 102 F.Supp.2d 33 (D. Me. 2000), affd 244 F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2001).
34 Jackson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 941 F.Supp. 1122 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
5 Stoutenborough v. National Football League, 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995).
3
See, e.g., Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 118 F.Supp.2d 494 (D.N.J. 2000), amended
6
3
after reargument, 1 0 F.Supp.2d 610 (2001); Matthews v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 179
3
F.Supp.2d 1209 (E.D. Wash. 2001).
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